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REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
This is the second appeal of this case. In its prior opinion, this Court decided virtually
all the issues raised by Plaintiffs in their responsive brief and brief on cross-appeal except
the issue of prejudice as a prong of the doctrine of laches used by the lower court to prevent
rescission. See Anderson, et al. v. Doms, et al.. No. 920653CA (Utah App. Nov. 4,
1994)(Doms Op. Br., Add. 1). In that decision, the Court of Appeals specifically found the
several challenges of Plaintiffs relating to the trial court's determination to allow Doms to
proceed with his Counterclaim "to be without merit." See Add. 1 at p. 2. Thus, the Court
of Appeals' opinion constitutes the "law of the case." See Thurston v. Box Elder Co., 892
P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995). Several arguments raised by Plaintiffs' cross-appeal and response
to Doms' arguments in this appeal are therefore barred by the previous decision of this
Court, and thus, become the "law of the case."
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO POMS' ARGUMENT THAT "THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT PREJUDICE HAD BEEN
ESTABLISHED" IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE LOWER COURT'S
RULING,
Plaintiff begins its response by claiming that Doms has failed to marshal the evidence
and, therefore, this Court should uphold the trial court's denial of rescission. However,
Doms argues in response that there is literally no evidence to marshal. This Court found
in its opinion in the first appeal of this case that:
The trial court madefindingsconcerning Doms' delay in bringing the action but
made no findings as to whether Appellants were prejudiced by the delay.
Therefore, we remand this case to the trial court for the purpose of entering
findings of fact relevant to whether Appellants were prejudiced by any delays
in Doms pursuing his Counterclaim.
No. 920653CA, p. 2, 3. (See Doms Op. Br., Add. 1, pp. 2, 3).
1

Doms argued in his opening brief that there was virtually no evidence to support the
Court's findings, and, therefore, none can be marshalled (see Doms Op. Br. pp. 22, 23).
Doms cited the case of Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991) for the
proposition that "Appellant need not go through a futile marshalling exercise. Rather,
Appellant can simply argue the legal insufficiency of the Court's findings as framed." The
additional findings regarding prejudice in this case do not embody sufficient detail and
include enough subsidiary facts to clearly show the evidence upon which they are grounded
as required by the Woodward court. Plaintiffs merely suggest that Doms has failed to
marshal the evidence but fail to make any citations to the record as to what evidence exists
that Doms failed to marshal. Doms claims no evidence of prejudice (except decreased
value) was ever presented or proffered in the lower court.
Interestingly enough, Plaintiffs then argue that "If Doms' assertions with respect to the
findings are correct, he is not entitled to rescission, but rather a remand for entiy of
sufficient findings." (See Plaintiffs Op. Br. p. 13). However, Plaintiffs have utterly failed
to present any specific facts upon which the additional findings of prejudice by the trial court
are grounded. How can the trial court make additional findings where no evidence exists
to support them? Doms suggests Plaintiffs have had their chance in this second appeal, but
if no facts exist to support the findings, the Court should merely remand and order
rescission.1
In this Court's opinion in 920653CA, this Court held: "If the trial court cannot find
from the evidence presented that the Appellants were prejudiced by the delay, the equitable
1

See Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989)
("Remand is not necessary if evidence in record is undisputed and appellate court can
fairly and properly resolve case on record before it."); see also, Kearns Tribune Corp. v.
Hornak. 917 P.2d 79 (Utah App. 1996).
2

doctrine of laches should not bar the remedy of rescission. Accordingly, we remand this
case to the trial court." (emphasis added).2 This is the ruling that Doms is asking this Court
to now make based upon the fact that no facts or evidence have been presented to this
Court (and indeed do not exist) to support the alleged new findings of prejudice made by
the lower court in paragraphs 10 (a) through 10 (h) in the lower court's Supplemental
Findings of Fact. See Doms Op. Br., Add. 2, pp. 4-6.
Plaintiffs also argue that rescission was not available to Doms because he did not own
and, therefore, could not tender the subject property. Again, this Court has decided this
issue in its Memorandum Opinion in Case No. 920653CA when it clearly held "We agree
with the trial court's decision to allow Doms to proceed with his Counterclaim and find
Appellants' arguments to be without merit." {See Doms Op. Br., Add. 1, p. 2) (R. 85538567). Plaintiffs' argument should be summarily rejected by this Court.
Despite the supplemental findings involving prejudice made by the lower court upon
remand, the court also made a second set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law upon
remand in its Order on Court's Minute Entry of May 6, 1997, attached as Addendum 3 to
Doms' opening brief (R. 8512-8517). The Conclusions of Law in issue on the point
regarding Doms' ownership of the property were:
1. Despite intervening conveyances between Doms and McCoy to Domcoy, the
foreclosure upon title to the Rossi Hills property by Summit County, and the
subsequent reconveyance to Doms by Summit County, Doms presently holds
clear title to the property and his right to pursue his Counterclaim is not
effected.
2. Plaintiffs lack standing to attack the validity of the warranty deed conveying
Rossi Hills from Domcoy to Doms which is a valid deed vesting title to the
2

(See Doms Op. Br., Add. 1 at p. 3). The Court should note that the Appellants
in that prior appeal were Plaintiffs. Doms is Appellant and Cross-Appellee in this
appeal.
3

property in Doms.
3. Doms is prosecuting his Second Amended Counterclaim as the real party in
interest, because Rossi Hills was never partnership property.
Therefore, the trial judge simply embodied this Court's decision in Case No.
920653CA in these Conclusions of Law.
Plaintiffs argue that "the Court's Supplemental Findings demonstrate that the (sic)
Doms had no basis for rescission." (See Plaintiffs' Op. Br. at p. 16). This Court has already
decided that Doms was entitled to rescission if the trial court could find prejudice; thus
Plaintiffs' argument in this regard should be summarily dismissed by this Court. Although
this Court did note in its opinion in Case No. 920653CA that" [I]n the event the trial court
does not rescind the transaction, the trial court should note that its findings and conclusions
do not adequately treat the effect of the intervening conveyances to and from Domcoy on
Doms' right to pursue his counterclaims and the effect of the default judgment entered
against McCoy and the sheriffs sale of McCoy's interest in Rossi Hills on Doms' ownership
interest in the property and any damages for breach of title warranties," the trial judge found
all of these issues in favor of Doms. See Doms Op. Br. Add 3., Findings of Fact 1-12, pp.
3-8 (R. 8513-8515).
The Court then concluded as a matter of law (as indicated previously): "Despite
intervening conveyances between Doms and McCoy to Domcoy, the foreclosure upon title
to the Rossie Hills property by Summit County, and the subsequent conveyance to Doms
by Summit County, Doms presently holds clear title to the property and his right to pursue
his counterclaim is not effected." See Doms Op. Br. Add. 3, Conclusion of Law No. 1, p.
5 (R. 8515).
Relating to the issue of "the effect of the default judgment entered against McCoy and
4

the sheriffs sale of McCoy's interest in Rossi Hills on Doms' ownership interest in the
property," the Court found as follows:
9. A sheriffs sale occurred on December 12, 1988, by the Sheriff of Summit
County and a corrected sheriffs deed bears the date of June 26, 1989,
transferring the interests of defendant McCoy in the Rossi Hills property to
plaintiffs.
10. At the time of the issuance of the sheriffs deed, defendant McCoy had no
ownership interest whatsoever in the Rossi Hills property.
See Doms Op. Br., Add. 3, Findings of Fact 9, 10, p. 4 (R. 8515).
In addition, the Court concluded as a matter of law:
4. The Default Judgment entered against McCoy and the sheriffs sale of
McCoy's interest in Rossi Hills has no effect on Doms' ownership interest in
the property and his ability to collect damages for breach of title warranties,
because McCoy had no ownership interest in Rossi Hills when the sheriffs sale
pursuant to the Default Judgment against McCoy was conducted; and plaintiffs,
therefore, acquired no ownership interest in the property from the sheriffs
sale.
See Doms Op. Br., Add. 3, Conclusion of Law No. 4 at p. 5 (R. 8516).
Finally, this Court indicated that the trial judge needed to further deal with the issue
of "any damages for breach of title warranties." The Court did in fact deal with that issue
as follows:
11. Doms and McCoy did not purchase the property as a partnership, and at
no time did either party hold the property as a partnership.
12. Plaintiffs have not sued Doms and McCoy in this lawsuit as a partnership,
and have never obtained or attempted to obtain a Judgment against Doms and
McCoy as a partnership.
See Doms Op. Br., Add. 3, Findings of Fact Nos. 11 and 12 at pp. 4, 5 (R. 8515, 8516).
Despite the foregoing Findings and Conclusions by the trial judge, Plaintiffs continue
to raise the argument that Doms knew of the encroachments on the property and, therefore,
rescission is not available to him. Although the lower court found that Doms was aware of

5

the encroachments, the court did not find anywhere in its Findings or Conclusions that
Doms understood the nature of the legal encumbrance on this subject property.
Doms cited to the court below the case of Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d
716 (Utah App. 1990), which is controlling and should determine the outcome of the instant
case. In Breuer-Harrison. like the instant case, the buyers walked the subject property with
the sellers' real estate agent prior to their purchase. 799 P.2d at 719. The sellers' agent,
(like Plaintiffs' agent, Sloan, in regard to the encroachments on Rossi Hills in the instant
case), was aware of what he termed a "water line" prior to the sale of the property, "but
considered it only a minor impediment to the development of the property for housing
units." Id. at 724. The buyers did not learn that this water line was an easement and
constituted a legal encumbrance on the subject property until some five years after their
purchase. Id. Although the buyers talked with the sellers approximately one year later
about rescinding the contract as an option, the buyers did not seek rescission until some four
years after they learned of the pipeline easement. Id. at 722, 726.
In the instant case, Doms immediately sought rescission after obtaining knowledge,
through his diligent efforts and those of Kinghorn, that there were legal encumbrances on
Rossi Hills.3 In Breuer-Harrison, this Court affirmed the summary judgment of the trial
court granting rescission to the buyers and rejecting the sellers' laches claim, because the
buyers were diligent in ascertaining the complete impact of the pipeline easement. Id. at
726-27. The holding and reasoning of this Court in Breuer-Harrison are a fortiori applicable
to the instant case and preclude application of laches against Doms.4
3

See R. 7500, 7504-05, 7611, 7625.

4

The Utah Supreme Court has recently held that when one panel of the Court of
Appeals is faced with a prior decision of a different panel, the doctrine of stare decisis
6

In light of the fact that this Court has specifically concluded in Case No. 920653CA
that the remedy of rescission is available to Doms if the Court finds prejudice in the case,
the Court should simply reject this argument made by Plaintiffe.
Plaintiffe also argue in their responsive brief that somehow Doms had two theories
with regard to his assertion of rescission. This is absolutely false! Doms has consistently
alleged the singular position that rescission should be available to him because covenants
against encumbrances contained in the warranty deed had been violated; and all of the
Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on this subject support that conclusion.5
Therefore, Plaintiffe' argument in this regard is without merit and should be
summarily rejected by this Court since the law of the case indicates that Doms should be
entitled to rescission as a matter of law, unless the record evidence showed a prejudice to
Plaintiffe.
Plaintiffe also argue that "Doms' failure to properly request rescission waived his right
to rescission." Again this Court has already determined that rescission is an appropriate
remedy if prejudice to Plaintiffe cannot be found, despite the three years after the purchase
when Doms finally obtained knowledge of the encumbrances and made his request for
rescission from Plaintiffe. (R. 7507-08). Again, the case of Breuer-Harrison v. Combe,
supra, is controlling. Despite the allegations of Plaintiffe in their brief to the contrary, in
Breuer-Harrison, this Court upheld the trial court's summary judgment of rescission as the

has equal application, although the doctrine is typically thought of as applying to a
single-panel appellate court. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993). Thus,
Doms' right to rescission and rejection of Plaintiffe' laches claim in the instant case
should be considered a matter of stare decisis.
5

See Doms Op. Br. Add. 5, Findings of Fact Nos. 6 through 15 (R. 6878, 6879);
Conclusions of Law Nos. 1 through 5 (R. 6889, 6890); Second Amended Judgment Nos.
3 and 4 (R. 6902).
7

appropriate remedy for the Plaintiffs, even though the Plaintiffs did not assert their right of
rescission for five years after they learned of an irremediable pipeline easement. 799 P.2d
at 726, 727. Again, this argument by Plaintiffs should be summarily rejected by this Court.
Finally, after 20 pages of their opening brief, Plaintiffe get to the true issue in this case
as to whether or not the trial court properly found Plaintiffs were prejudiced by Doms'
delay. In his opening brief, Doms argued that the Court's Findings of Fact regarding
prejudice in its Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as per the
Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 1996, were not supported
by any evidence in the record and, therefore, constituted an abuse of discretion by the
Court. Doms first argued that paragraph 10 (a) was conclusoiy, insufficiently detailed, and
lacked evidentiary support. The only response to this argument set out by Plaintiffe in their
opening brief on pages 23 and 24 is that "Doms had the benefit of the property to exclusion
of Plaintiffe during this six-year period between the time of the purchase and the time of the
tender of rescission offer." Plaintiffe then cite the case of Taylor v. Moore, 51 P.2d 222
(Utah 1935) as somehow supporting this Finding of Fact. It is significant that Plaintiffe do
not cite any portion of the record which supports this Finding of Fact; and, therefore, the
Court may conclude, as claimed by Doms in his opening brief, that there is no record
evidence to support this Finding of Fact. Furthermore, Plaintiffe' allegation that there was
a "six-year period between the time of the purchase and the time of the tender of the
rescission offer" directly contradicts Plaintiffs' previous statement on page 18 of their
opening brief that "Doms has admitted that his rescission request was not filed for at least
three years after the purchase."
In fact, the uncontradicted evidence in the record is that the property was purchased
in March of 1982 (R. 6877); and Doms' tender of rescission occurred in January of 1985 (R.
8

7504-07). Furthermore, although the 1935 case of Taylor v. Moore does in fact suggest that
a party is not allowed to "go on deriving all possible benefits from the transaction, and then
claim to be relieved of his own obligations by seeking its rescission," Doms in this case did
not derive any benefits from this transaction since the Court found that the encumbrances
existed from the day the transaction took place.6
Furthermore, no evidence exists on the record that Doms "benefited" in any way from
the transaction at the expense of the Plaintiffs since there was no development efforts
whatsoever made upon the property by Doms.
As with Finding 10(a), the Court should note that Findings 10(b), 10(c), 10(d), and
10(e) contain no references whatsoever to the record with regard to any evidence presented
in the lower court to support these findings. In fact, Plaintiffs make a completely
disingenuous and false argument when they state that Plaintiffs were somehow required to
move to clear title to the property and, therefore, had to file Case No. 10066 (a companion
case joined with the instant case), to clear title to the property. What makes this statement
completely false and misleading is that, although the property was sold at tax sale based
upon Domcoy's failure to pay property taxes, Domcoy purchased the property back from
Summit County on August 24,1988; and Domcoy by Warranty Deed dated August 26, 1988,
conveyed Rossi Hills back to Doms. (Doms Op. Br., Add. 19 and 20) (R. 3117, 3160-61).
Therefore, Doms was then fully possessed of the property in fee simple. See Doms Op. Br.,
Add. 3, Conclusion of Law No. 1 (R. 8515).
Despite this fact, and in their stubbornly litigious fashion, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint

6

"5. The aforesaid statutory covenants contained in the warranty deed were
breached upon the delivery of the warranty deed to Doms on March 23, 1982." See
Doms Op. Br., Add. 5, Conclusion of Law No. 17 (R. 6891).
9

in Civil No. 10066 on December 19,1988, almost four months after Poms had repurchased
the property from Summit County. Their Complaint in Case No. 10066 (joined with lower
court Case No. 8339 and, therefore, by implication joined on appeal in the instant matter)
alleged that Summit County had improperly sold the property at tax sale since they had
failed to notify Plaintiffs, as trust deed holders, that a sale was taking place. This was so,
despite the fact that Doms had already repurchased the property and Plaintiffs could not
have possibly been damaged by this tax sale. The parties ultimately stipulated, and the
Court concluded, that the tax sale was unconstitutional and illegal and set it aside.
However, in light of the fact that Doms was at that time in possession of the property,
having repurchased it almost four months prior to the time Civil No. 10066 was ever filed
by Plaintiffs, the issue was completely and entirely moot; although the lower court awarded
some attorney's fees to Plaintiffs for having filed this frivolous lawsuit. See Doms Op. Br.
pp. 34-36.
In responding to Doms' argument regarding paragraph 10(c), Plaintiffs argue prejudice
existed because one of the four sellers of the property, D.C. Anderson, had died; and
therefore, his version of the transaction was no longer available. However, there is no
citation whatsoever to the record showing a proffer to the lower court as to what his
testimony would have been with regard to his version of the transaction. Furthermore, there
is no suggestion in the record whatsoever, or even in Plaintiffs' opening brief, that the
deceased's version of the transaction would in any way have affected the case one way or
the other. In fact, the record in this case reflects that neither Plaintiffs Ellen Anderson,
Dan Scott, or Jeanne Scott, the other three living Plaintiffs, testified at trial as to their
version of the events. Plaintiffs did call their agent, Mike Sloan, who testified as to certain
events which occurred surrounding the transaction, but none of the Plaintiffs themselves
10

testified. Therefore, again, we find that the argument that Plaintiffs were prejudiced by the
death of D.C. Anderson, one of the Plaintiffs, is disingenuous at best, and is simply not
supported by the record. Therefore, this fact cannot constitute prejudice to Plaintiffs.
With regard to Finding 10(d), Plaintiffs claim they were prejudiced by the fact that
Doms did nothing in an effort to clear the encroachments and easements. However, as
found by the trial court, the encroachments had been on the property "in excess of 40 years"
causing the Court to conclude as a matter of law that "said encumbrances existed on the
Rossi Hills property on the date of the deliveiy of the deed, which was March 23, 1982."7
Furthermore, the Court also concluded as a matter of law, unchallenged by Plaintiffs at any
point on appeal, that "Under Utah law, it was the Plaintiffs' burden and obligation to
mitigate the damages suffered by Doms because Plaintiffs were in breach of the statutory
covenants contained in the deed at the time the deed was delivered."8

The

inappropriateness of Plaintiffs' argument on this point can further be seen by Plaintiffs
statement that "legal actions by the Plaintiffs to clear the encroachments and easements
should they be forced to reacquire the property through rescission would now be virtually
impossible."9 This argument is disingenuous at best and false and misleading at worst. This
is because the encroachments had met the 20-year requirement under Utah law at the time
Plaintiffs transferred the property to Doms as found by the trial court; thus it was Plaintiffs'
obligation, not the grantee, Doms', obligation to clear the property of these encroachments,

7

See Doms Op. Br., Add. 5, Second Amended Findings of Fact No. 9; Second
Amended Conclusion of Law No. 3 (R. 6878, 6889).
8

See Add. 5 to Doms' Op. Br.; Second Amended Conclusion of Law No. 17 (R.

6891).
9

Plaintiffs Op. Br. pp. 23, 24.
11

since Plaintiffe were statutorily guaranteeing to the grantee that there were no encumbrances
or encroachments which would burden the property. The possibility that, if Plaintiffe now
receive the property back they will be unable to clear the encroachments and easements,
places them in no better or worse position then they were in when they transferred the
property to Doms on March 23, 1982. See Doms Op. Br., Add. 5, Conclusion of Law Nos.
3, 4, and 5 (R. 6889, 6890).
Finally with regard to Finding 10(e), this Court rejected the idea that prejudice exists
merely from a decrease in the value of property in its opinion in Case No. 920653CA.10
Furthermore, the exact same argument of a plummeting real estate market and
substantially decreased real estate values was made by the sellers in the Breuer-Harrison
case, supra, and was categorically rejected by this Court. 799 P.2d at 726-27.
Since Finding of Fact 10(f) simply restates Finding 10(e), the same arguments apply.
Furthermore, Plaintiffe make no response to Doms' argument in his opening brief that
Findings of Fact 10(g) and 10(h) are Conclusions of Law and cannot possibly be seen as
findings of fact supported by evidence from the record, which therefore supports prejudice
to Plaintiffe in allowing the doctrine of laches to prevent rescission in this case. Therefore,
these two findings should be ignored by this Court.
POINT II
DOMS IS ENTITLED TO HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS. AND THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
10

The Court ruled in a footnote "We note that we do not agree that anytime
property increases or decreases in value, the prejudice prong of the laches defense is
automatically met. (Citing cases) . . . a change in property value is one factor the Court
should consider in determining prejudice (citing cases). Further, other courts have
determined that a change in property value did not prejudice landowners because the
change could be taken into account by a court of equity in fashioning a just remedy,
(citing cases)." See Doms Op. Br., Add. 1, Memorandum Decision 920653CA, n. 1.
12

COSTS TO PLAINTIFFS,
Although Plaintiffs attempt to argue that Doms did not claim attorney's fees for
having to defend his "title" to the property, and that was because his "title" was not attacked,
this statement by Plaintiffs is again false and disingenuous at best. This can be see in Point
I of Plaintiffs' opening brief in this matter, where Plaintiffs continue to make the argument
that Doms had somehow lost title of his property because he and McCoy had transferred
the property to the company Domcoy Inc., which had subsequently transferred it back to
Doms; an argument previously rejected both by the trial court and this Court in the first
appeal.11
Plaintiffs also inappropriately argue "Had the tax sale (in Case No. 10066) not been
set aside, the Plaintiffs' trust deed would have been extinguished by operation of law. This
made Civil No. 10066 necessary."12 Again, this argument is false and disingenuous at best,
in light of the fact that, although the property had been sold by Summit County at a tax sale,
Domcoy repurchased the property on August 24, 1988, and received a Quit-Claim Deed
from Summit County conveying it back; and on August 26, 1988, Domcoy conveyed Rossi
Hills by warranty deed to Doms (See Dofns Op. Br., Add 19 and Add. 20). Again, it should
be noted that Civil No. 10066 was not filed by Plaintiffs until December 19, 1988, almost
four months after Doms had received valid title to the Rossi Hills property. (See R. 2-66,
Supp. Record of Case No. 10066).
It is significant that no case law whatsoever is cited by Plaintiffs suggesting that "had
the tax sale not been set aside, the Plaintiffs trust deed would have been extinguished by
11

See Doms Op. Br., Add. 3, Findings of Fact. 1-8, Conclusions of Law 1-3 (R.
8513-8516); Doms Op. Br., Add. 1, p. 2.
12

See Plaintiffs Op. Br. p. 26.
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operation of law." The Court is asked to reject and ignore this unsupported assertion and
to find that the tax sale was merely an indication of the stubbornly litigious manner in which
Plaintiffs pursued this lawsuit. In addition tofilingthis completely separate action, Plaintiffs
also filed an interlocutory appeal with the Supreme Court when the lower court ruled that
Plaintiff Jeanne Scott be joined as involuntary Plaintiff; and then would not accept the
decision of the Supreme Court and later filed a petition for injunctive relief with the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied each of these efforts by Plaintiffs; and yet,
preempting the prerogative of the Supreme Court, the lower court awarded some attorney's
fees to Plaintiffs for having brought these actions. See Doms Op. Br. pp. 36, 37.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs respond to Doms' argument that Judge Frederick ordered
sanctions against Doms for failing to respond to discovery without allowing the hearing
required under Rule 37(a)(4), U.R.C.P. by claiming that a hearing on December 31, 1991,
was "devoted to an evidentiary hearing regarding attorney's fees." This argument is false and
misleading! The truth is that the hearing of December 31, 1991, was held specifically for
the purpose of determining the amount of attorney's fees, and the Court refused to become
involved in this issue as to whether or not the attorney's fees were appropriate under Rule
37(a)(4) despite the request by Doms' counsel that the Court do so. (See R. 6360-6540).
The Court will note in reviewing the record of that proceeding that at no time is Doms
given an opportunity to explain to the Court why he objected to and refused to answer
certain discovery requests. Furthermore, Doms has never been given an opportunity to
explain to Judge Rokich, as the trial judge in that amount hearing, that Judge Frederick had
partially ruled in favor of Doms and against Plaintiffs, and yet awarded attorney's fees
against Doms. Furthermore, Doms was not allowed to explain that Judge Frederick was in
error in awarding attorney's fees against him for filing an additional motion for the required
14

hearing under Rule 37(a)(4) which was summarily denied by Judge Frederick with an award
of additional attorney's fees (R. 1968; see Doms Op. Br. Add. 28).
Therefore, the arguments made by Doms in his opening brief on pages 38 through 41
are appropriate and the Court is asked to review them again.
It is also important to note that in his opening brief, Doms claims that he is entitled
to a refund of a substantial amount of the attorney's fees and costs paid to Plaintiffs as a
condition of the trial court setting aside the default judgment; and no mention whatsoever
of that issue, let alone a rebuttal to it, is provided by Plaintiffs in their responsive brief.
POINT III
PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENTS ON CROSS-APPEAL
SUMMARILY DISMISSED BY THIS COURT,

SHOULD

BE

In their arguments on cross-appeal, Plaintiffs continue to ask the Court to revisit
issues that the Court has already decided in Doms' favor in its Memorandum Opinion in
Case No. 920653CA. Point IV of Plaintiffs' opening brief argues that Doms is not entitled
to an award of damages against Plaintiffs because he only owned an undivided one-half
interest subject to the trust deed. On remand, the trial court found in its "Order on Court's
Minute Entry of May 6, 1997," that Doms was properly possessed of the property in
question, despite transfers to a corporation and retransfers to Doms, and that Doms
possessed the property in fee simple at the present time. The Court concluded as a matter
of law that "despite intervening conveyances between Doms and McCoy to Domcoy, the
foreclosure upon title to the Rossi Hills property by Summit County, and the subsequent
reconveyance to Doms by Summit County, Doms presently holds clear title to the property
and his right to pursue his Counterclaim is not affected."13 Furthermore, the lower court
13

See Doms Op. Br., Add. 3, Conclusion of Law No. 1 (R. 8515).
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found that "Plaintiffs lack standing to attack the validity of the Warranty Deed conveying
Rossi Hills from Domcoy to Doms which is a valid deed vesting title to the properly in
Doms."14 The Court also concluded as a matter of law, after finding the appropriate facts,
that "the default judgment entered against McCoy and the sheriffs sale of McCoy's interest
in Rossi Hills has no affect on Doms' ownership interest in the property and his ability to
collect damages for breach of title warranties, because McCoy had no ownership in Rossi
Hills when the sheriffs sale pursuant to the default judgment against McCoy was conducted;
and Plaintiffs, therefore, acquired no ownership interest in the property from the sheriffs
sale."15 Since Doms has clearly been held to own 100% of the property, it is respectfully
requested that this argument by Plaintiffs be summarily dismissed by the Court.
Plaintiffs also argue in Point V of their brief that Doms was precluded from a trial
on damages for breach of warranty. However, this argument seems to be based upon an
election of remedies argument which has been rejected by the trial judge and by this Court
as well.
Under Utah law, a party has not been required to "elect remedies" as erroneously
claimed by Plaintiffs since at least the adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on
January 1, 1950. Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a party may demand judgment for the relief to
which he is entitled, and that "[r]elief in the alternative or of several different types may be
demanded." Rule 8(e)(2) further provides that "[a] party may also state as many separate
claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or on
equitable grounds or on both."

14

See Doms Op. Br., Add. 3, Conclusion of Law No. 2 (R. 8516).

15

See Doms Op. Br., Add. 3, Conclusion of Law No. 4 (R. 8516).
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Furthermore, Rule 18(a) provides that a party "may join either as independent or as
alternate claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both as he may have against an
opposing party." Finally, Rule 54(c)(1) provides that "every final judgment shall grant the
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings."
The argument now advanced by Plaintiffs in Point V of their opening brief was
rejected by the Utah Supreme Court 36 years ago in Smoot v. Lund, 369 P.2d 933 (Utah
1962). In Smoot, the Court held that a party is not required to elect which remedy he
wishes to proceed on during the trial of the case. The Court cited Rules 18(a) and 8(e)(2),
U.R.C.P., and held that "[t]hey show a clear purpose to eliminate rigidity of rules and
technical objections as to the form or nomenclature for claims for relief." 369 P.2d at 935.
See also Rosander v. Larsen. 376 P.2d 146 (Utah 1962).
Therefore, this Court should summarily reject this argument as the trial court did and
as this Court apparently did in its Memorandum Opinion in Case No. 920653CA.
The arguments in Point VI and Point VII in Plaintiffs' brief alleging that Anderson
and Scott are entitled to the benefit provided in the contract, and that set-off was not
available to Doms clearly are not applicable, and are merely duplicative of arguments
regarding the alleged necessity for the tax sale case, Case No. 10066, and Doms' knowledge
of the existence of the encumbrances at the time of the purchase of the property.
Finally, Plaintiffs once again raise the statute of limitations issue which was denied by
the lower court and was clearly denied by this Court in its Memorandum Opinion in Case
No. 920653CA. This Court specifically noted that one of Plaintiffs' claims alleging that
Doms was not entitled to proceed with the Counterclaim was "whether the statute of
limitations barred the counterclaim." The Court went on to rule "We agree with the trial
17

court's decision to allow Doms to proceed with his Counterclaim and find Appellants'
arguments to be without merit. Thus, we decline to address them." Again, this now
becomes the law of the case and this argument should again be summarily rejected by this
Court.
POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RULING THE WARRANTY DEED. TRUST
DEED AND TRUST DEED NOTE DO NOT CONSTITUTE A SINGLE
CONTRACT OR TRANSACTION. AND BY REFUSING TO RULE THAT
DOMS WAS EXCUSED FROM PERFORMANCE AND NOT IN DEFAULT
UNDER THE TRUST DEED AND TRUST DEED NOTE.
Plaintiffs argue in their brief on cross-appeal that this Court, if it finds that Doms is
not entitled to rescission, should then reverse and remand and uphold the final judgment
of the trial court, with the modifications they suggest in their brief. It apparently is
Plaintiffs belief that the mere fact that Doms might lose on the issue of rescission should
essentially end the case; however, as Doms argued in his briefs in Case No. 920653CA, if
rescission is not allowed, this Court should reverse the trial court and find that it erred by
ruling the warranty deed, trust deed, and trust deed note do not constitute a single contract
or transaction; and by refusing to rule that Doms was excused from performance and not
in default under the trust deed and trust deed note.16
A.

The warranty deed, trust deed and trust deed note constitute a single contract or
transaction and must be construed together in determining the rights and obligations
of the parties.
The warranty deed conveying Rossi Hills to Doms and McCoy was executed by

Plaintiffs in consideration for the execution of the trust deed and trust deed note by Doms
and McCoy. These three documents, all bearing the same date of March 10, 1982,
16

See Doms Op. Br. Add 5, Second Amended Conclusions of Law Nos. 6, 7, 8,
and 9 (R. 6890).
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constitute a single contract or transaction evidencing the sale of Rossi Hills.
Pursuant to Utah statutes and case law, a trust deed or mortgage must include a deed
of conveyance such as a warranty deed.17 Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has
definitively ruled that the legal debt or obligation secured by a trust deed or mortgage is
part of and inseparable from the trust deed or mortgage: "As a matter of law, in order to
establish a valid trust deed or mortgage, a legal debt or obligation with a specific amount
owing must exist." Bangerter v. Poulton. 663 P.2d 100, 101 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added).
In accord General Glass Corp. v. Mast Construction Co., 766 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App.
1988), cert denied. 109 Utah Adv. Rep. (Utah 1989). The interest of a mortgagee under
a mortgage or a beneficiary under a trust deed is "a mere lien, incapable of being separated
from the debt and transferred by itself." State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsey, 565 P.2d 413, 415
(Utah 1977)(emphasis added); Belnap v. Blain, 575 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1978).
The unquestioned law in Utah is that a note and mortgage (which includes the
warranty deed) constitute a single contract. In First Savings Bank of Ogden v. Brown, 54
P.2d 237, 240-41 (Utah 1936), the Utah Supreme Court held as follows: "The note and
mortgage, given at the same time, and as parts of the same transaction, must be construed
together as constituting one contract. They supplement each other and express the entire
contract between the parties." (emphasis added).18
The fact that a warranty deed, trust deed and trust deed note are deemed to
constitute a single contract under clear Utah law simply follows the general rule of law in
17

See U.C.A. §§ 574-12, 574-14, 57-1-19 (Add. 23); W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio
Nat. Res. Co.. 627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981); Bown v. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292, 297 (Utah
1984).
18

See also Brown v. Skeen. 58 P.2d 24, 32-33 (Utah 1936); Bvbee v. Stuart, 189
P.2d 118, 122-23 (Utah 1948); Kiar v. Brimlev. 497 P.2d 23, 25-26 (Utah 1972).
19

Utah and throughout the country that contemporaneously executed instruments regarding
the same subject matter or transaction must be construed together as a single contract. This
basic principal of law is clearly set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Bullfrog Marina, Inc.
v. Lentz. 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972):
[Wjhere two or more instruments are executed by the same parties contemporaneously, or at different times in the course of the same transaction, and concern
the same subject matter, they will be read and construed together as far as
determining the respective rights and interests of the parties, although thev do
not in terms refer to each other.
501 P.2d at 271 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).19
The fact that the warranty deed must be considered to be part of a single contract or
transaction along with the other documents of transfer is further emphasized by all of the
Utah rescission cases cited in this brief, and especially Breuer-Harrison v. Combe, supra.
In each of these cases, the entire transaction was rescinded, not just the warranty deed.
The trial court adopted the erroneous and completely unsubstantiated argument
advanced by Plaintiffs that the Rossi Hills transaction should be split into separate contracts
involving the "sale" evidenced by the warranty deed as one contract; and the "financing"
evidenced by the trust deed and trust deed note as another contract. The trial court
erroneously applied the doctrine of merger, which has nothing to do with this issue, to
somehow reach its conclusion splitting the transaction into separate contracts. Therefore,
Conclusions of Law 6, 7, 8 and 9, supra footnote 16, represent clear errors of law by the trial
court and must be reversed.
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In accord First Security Bank of Utah, NA. v. Maxwell 659 P.2d 1078, 1080
(Utah 1983); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Big
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1358-59 (Utah App.
1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) O F CONTRACTS § 202(2).
20

B.

Plaintiffs were in breach of contract when they delivered the warranty deed conveying
Rossi Hills with encumbrances and title defects.
The trial court correctly ruled in Conclusion of Law 5 (R. 6890) that the statutory

covenants contained in the warranty deed pursuant to U.C.A. § 57-1-12 were breached by
Plaintiffs upon delivery of the warranty deed on March 23, 1982.20
C,

Poms was excused from all performance regarding the Rossi Hills transaction, and
therefore was never in default under the trust deed and trust deed note.
In Bergstrom v. Moore, supra, the Utah Supreme Court held as follows: "If it plainly

appears that a seller has lost or encumbered his ownership so that he will not be able to
fulfill his contract, he cannot insist that a buyer continue to make payments." 677 P.2d at
1125 (citations omitted and emphasis added). In other words, the buyer is excused from
performance under the contract because he is not considered under the law to be in default.
In regard to the law of contracts in general, clear Utah case law and the general rule
of law throughout the country holds that where one party to a contract has failed or refused
to perform an obligation under it, the non-breaching party is excused from performance
under the contract, and may recover all money already paid and other losses incurred by
him.

Sprague v. Bovles Bros. Drilling Co., 294 P.2d 689, 693 (Utah 1956).21 The

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§ 274(1), cited by the Utah Supreme Court in Sprague,

frames the issue in terms of a failure of consideration by the breaching party which

20

Bergstom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1984); Soderberg v. Holt 46
P.2d 428, 431 (Utah 1935).
21

Sprague cites the following authority in support of this proposition: Anvil
Mining Co. v. Humble, 153 U.S. 540 (1894); 5 WlLLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1303 (rev.
ed.); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 274(1). See also 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts §§
621, 664, 701; 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 452; Sjoberg v. Kravik. 759 P.2d 966, 969 (Mont.
1988); Sharbono v. Darden. 715 P.2d 433, 435 (Mont. 1986); O'Hara Group Denver, Ltd.
v. Marcor Housing Systems, Inc., 595 P.2d 679, 684-85 (Colo. 1979).
21

discharges the non-breaching party from his duties under the contract. Comment (a) to §
274 explains that in any such case, the non-breaching party is excused from performance and
may reclaim what he has given, or its value. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held
that failure of consideration is a complete defense to any claim of the breaching party based
upon the contract, and that the non-breaching party is excused from performance and not
in default under the contract.22
D.

If rescission is denied, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and
remanded with directions to enter judgment in accordance with the law as set forth
above.
Second Amended Conclusions of Law 6-9 (R. 6890), 20-32 (R. 6891-6894), and 51-54

(R. 6898); and paragraphs 1 (R. 6901), 5-12 (R. 6903-6905), and 19-22 (R. 6906) of the
Judgment; all constitute errors of law by the trial court which must be reversed under the
legal correctness standard of review. These errors of law are in regard to the trial court's
rulings splitting the Rossi Hills transaction into separate contracts; holding Doms in default
under the trust deed and trust deed note; foreclosing on Doms' interest in Rossi Hills in a
"hybrid" procedure involving mortgages and/or trust deeds; awarding Plaintiffs amounts due
under the trust deed and trust deed note plus interest; and awarding Plaintiffs attorney's fees
and costs based upon Doms' alleged default under the trust deed and trust deed note.
If rescission is denied, on remand the trial court should be directed to enter a
judgment consistent with the principals of law set forth in subpoints A through D above.
The judgment should be that Doms must pay the purchase price of the property, with a set-
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See Assets Realization Co. v. Cardon, 272 P. 204, 207 (Utah 1928); General Ins.
Co. of Am. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp.. 545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1976); Bentlev v.
Potter. 694 P.2d 617, 619 (Utah 1984) (quoting 6 S. WlLLlSTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 814, at 17-78 (3d ed. 1962)); Copper State Leasing v. Blacker Appliance, 770
P.2d 88, 91 (Utah 1988).
22

off for all amounts received by Plaintiffs toward the purchase of the property and for any
damages suffered by Doms as a result of Plaintiffs' breach of contract.
Doms owes Plaintiffs nothing under the trust deed and trust deed note, and is entitled
to the following amounts as set-offs against the $276,750.00 purchase price of Rossi Hills:
1. $82,500.00, which represents the earnest money payment of $10,000.00 and the
down payment of $72,500.00 {See Doms Op. Br., Add. 5, Findings of Fact No. 18 (R. 6879)).
2. $72,520.25, which represents the sum total of all monthly payments received by
Plaintiffs under the trust deed note (Id. Findings of Fact No. 22 (R. 6880)). Since Doms
was excused from performance under the trust deed note, no interest ever accrued and all
such monthly payments were principal payments and represent additional set-offe against the
purchase price of the property (Id. Findings of Fact No. 21 (R. 6880)).
3. The amount of damages suffered by Doms as a result of the encumbrances existing
on Rossi Hills, the trial court concluded, was $83,000.00 (Id. Conclusion of Law No. 19 (R.
6891)). However, Doms submits that the trial court abused its discretion in this award, and
the damages suffered by Doms as a result of the encumbrances should be $166,050.00. (R.
7863-64; Ex. 88D pp. 38-39, 55, 75; 7848-49, 7866, 7870, 8208-09).23
23

An expert real estate appraiser, Jeny R. Webber, compiled an extensive
appraisal report totaling 112 pages (including 37 pages of addenda), in which Webber
appraised the fair market value of Rossi Hills in March of 1982 both with and without
the encumbrances found by the trial court to exist on Rossi Hills (Ex. 88D). Webber
calculated that the fair market value of Rossi Hills in March of 1982 without considering
any encumbrances of any kind on the property was $276,750.00, which corresponds
exactly to the purchase price actually paid for the property. This calculation was based
on a maximum of ten residential units (five duplexes) which could be built on the
property, with a valuation of $27,675.00 per unit (R. 7863-64; Ex. 88D, p. 55). Applying
the correct law as set forth by the trial court in Conclusions of Law 13-15, the damages
suffered by Doms as a result of the encumbrances on Rossi Hills in March of 1982
should be $166,050.00, which represents the difference in the fair market value of the
property without any encumbrances ($276,750.00) minus the value of the property with
the encumbrances ($110,700.00). It is apparent that the trial court arbitrarily cut the
23

4. Prejudgment interest under U.C.A. § 15-1-1 should be awarded to Doms at the
rate of 10% per annum, on all amounts received by Plaintiffs pursuant to the Rossi Hills
transaction from the date each such payment was received to the entry of judgment by the
trial court on remand. Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977), cert,
denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977); Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 88 P. 1003, 1006-07 (Utah
1907).
5. Prejudgment interest on the amount of damages ultimately awarded to Doms
should also be awarded from March 23, 1982, the date the warranty deed was delivered, to
the final entry of judgment by the trial court on remand. Bjork, supra; Fell, supra.24
6. All attorney's fees and costs should be awarded to Doms, plus prejudgment interest
on the award of attorney's fees (See Doms Op. Br., Point II).
CONCLUSION
The trial court's Findings of Fact on remand regarding alleged prejudice suffered by
Plaintiffe through Doms' delay in seeking rescission are not supported by the evidence in
the record.

Because the trial court was unable to enter additional Findings of Fact

concerning prejudice which are supported by the record, Doms is entitled to rescission.
Furthermore, if this Court should deny Doms the remedy of rescission, it should find
amount of damages found by Webber as a result of the encumbrances on the property in
half, and ruled that Doms had suffered $83 000.00 in damages rather than $166,050.00
(C. of L. 19; Judgment, U 4). The judgment of the trial court was arbitraiy and
constitutes an abuse of discretion because it is manifestly unjust and was unduly
influenced by evidence which should have been completely disregarded by the trial court.
Mavbev v. Kav Peterson Const. Co., 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984).
24

See also Uintah Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885 (Utah
1976); Gillespie v. Blood, 17 P.2d 822 (Utah 1932); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. Love,
196 P. 305 (Utah 1921); Wheatlev v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 162 P. 86 (Utah 1916);
Railroad v. Board of Education. 99 P. 263 (Utah 1909); East Canyon Land & Stock Co.
v. Davis & Weber Counties Canal Co., 238 P. 280 (Utah 1925).
24

that the warranty deed, trust deed, and trust deed note were all one single transaction, and
that that contract was breached by Plaintiffe when they violated the statutory warranties
against encumbrances. Doms should thus be excused from performance on the trust deed
note, and the trust deed should be invalidated by the Court. Finally, Doms should be
entitled to recover all sums paid and be awarded all damages proven at trial in this matter;
with attorney's fees being awarded to him as the prevailing party in this case.
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